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Executive Summary 
The current system in which prescription drug trials are financed, and often conducted directly by 
the  company  holding  intellectual  property  rights  in  the  drugs,  leads  to  substantial  economic 
inefficiency  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  creates  an  obvious  conflict  of  interest  since  the  party 
conducting  the  trial  has  a  direct  financial  stake  in  the  outcome.  The  second  major  source  of 
inefficiency is that recovering the investment from the trials through higher drug prices leads to a 
much larger gap between drug prices and the marginal cost of production.  
 
This paper outlines a proposal for public funding of prescription drug trials, through contracting 
with private sector firms to conduct trials. The cost of the trials, approximately $20 billion in 2007, 
could be more than recovered by paying lower prices for drugs purchased through the Medicare 
prescription drug program. This price reduction would be brought about by changing the rules on 
the  drug  program  so  that  Medicare  would  negotiate  prices  in  the  same  way  as  the  Veteran’s 
Administration. Removing the conflict of interest inherent in the current system of clinical trials and 
bringing drug prices closer to marginal costs would eliminate much of the inefficiency of the current 
system. It could also lead to substantial public health benefits. 
 
If the public financing of drug trials is tied to a mandated reduction of 40 percent in the prices paid 
for drugs in the Medicare drug program (making prices paid in the Medicare program comparable to 
the prices paid by the Veterans Administration), the savings net of the cost of the trials over a ten-
year  period  would  be  approximately  $50  billion.  If  state  and  local  governments  also  had 
corresponding reductions in the prices paid for prescription drugs, their ten-year savings would be 
over $120 billion. If these price reductions were applied to the private sector as well, they would 
total more than $900 billion. 
 
In addition to these potential savings, the paper describes a number of other potential benefits from 
a system of publicly financed prescription drug trials:  
 
1)  Publicly funded trials would eliminate the incentive and the opportunity to conceal evidence 
that  a  drug  may  have  harmful  side  effects  or  to  exaggerate  evidence  of  the  drug’s 
effectiveness. There have been numerous instances of such behavior, as has been recently 
alleged  in  the  case  of  efforts  to  conceal  negative  side  effects  associated  with  the  pain 
medication Vioxx. 
 
2)  A  system  of  publicly  financed  clinical  trials  could  lead  to  lower  costs  because  it  would 
eliminate the incentive to carry duplicative drugs through the trial process in the hope of 
recovering sunk research costs. The current system provides this incentive even in cases 
where there is little reason to expect that the drug would provide any significant benefit 
compared with already approved drugs.  
 
3)  Publicly funded trials may be conducted at a lower cost than industry sponsored trials since 
there would be no incentive for independent contractors to overpay participating physicians 
as a way to encourage them to prescribe the company’s drugs. 
 
4)  Research could advance more quickly since all the results of the trials conducted through a 
publicly funded system would be immediately and fully disclosed allowing other researchers 
to benefit from this information. 
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5)  Publicly funded research trials would eliminate a mechanism (data exclusivity) which is being 
used to obtain marketing exclusivity, and therefore raise the price of prescription drugs in 
many developing countries.  
 
6)  Lower drug prices would eliminate the incentive for most of the marketing done by the 
industry. The cost of this marketing is close to 20 percent of the sales of the prescription 
drug industry. It provides relatively little useful information to physicians. 
 
7)  Lower drug prices would substantially reduce the waste associated with efforts by insurers 
and other third party payers to restrict the use of high priced drugs. Since the third party 
payers can never know the circumstances as well as the doctor and patient, restrictions will 
inevitably result in denying drugs in some cases where the cost would be justified by benefits 
to the patient. Furthermore, doctors and patients have a strong incentive to find ways to 
circumvent any restrictions and may devote considerable resources towards this end. Sharply 
lower drug prices would substantially reduce the incentives for such behavior. 
 
8)  Lower  drug  prices  would  substantially  reduce  the  incentive  for  patients  to  seek  out 
unauthorized versions of drugs and also for manufacturers to produce counterfeit versions 
of expensive drugs.  
 
Introduction 
Health care professionals have long been concerned about the potential for corruption in clinical 
trials of prescription drugs that are sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry. Since the company 
sponsoring a trial has a very strong material incentive in finding positive results for its drugs, there is 
reason to believe that researchers carrying through drug trials may be biased and therefore may not 
accurately report the outcome of trials (Turner et al., 2008; Bodenheimer, 2000; Cho and Bero, 1996; 
Friedberg, 1998; and Stelfox, 1998).   
 
In addition to the incentive to falsify or misrepresent research findings, the current system also 
suffers from other types of rent-seeking behavior that harm the public’s health and raise the cost of 
drugs. For example, companies may carry through clinical trials even when they have little reason to 
expect that their drug will be better than existing alternatives. The current system provides the 
incentive to develop and promote copycat drugs because companies can hope to capture a portion 
of the patent rents earned by already approved drugs, and thereby recover a portion of sunk research 
costs, even if their drug is likely to provide little or no net medical benefit. The trials themselves can 
also  provide  an  effective  method  for  drug  companies  to  convey  kickbacks  to  physicians  who 
prescribe their drugs, since the payment to participating physicians can be larger than is necessary to 
cover the cost of drug trials (e.g. see Andersen et al., 2006; Gardiner, 2004; Eichenwald and Colata, 
1999a and Eichenwald and Colata, 1999b).  
 
One way to circumvent the inefficiency and rent-seeking behavior associated with industry-funded 
clinical trials is to have publicly financed clinical trials. This paper outlines a proposal for publicly 
financed clinical trials as an alternative to industry funded trials.
1 The cost of these trials could be 
covered by negotiating reduced payments for prescription drugs in government programs, most 
importantly for the drugs purchased through Medicare Part D. If Medicare reduced its payments for 
                                                 
1 Tracy Lewis, Jerome Reichman, and Anthony So recently outlined a plan for publicly financed clinical trials (2007). 
While the proposal described in this paper was in large part inspired by this plan, it is not necessarily the same as the 
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prescription drugs to levels comparable to those paid by the Veterans Administration, through a 
comparable  negotiation  process,  the  savings  would  easily  exceed  the  cost  of  publicly  financing 
clinical trials. In effect, under this arrangement, the pharmaceutical industry would be compensated 
for lower drug prices by having the public sector pick up the cost of conducting clinical drug trials.  
 
Reducing the price of prescription drugs, and thereby bringing drug prices closer to marginal cost, 
would also have substantial public health benefits. In addition to making drugs more affordable, it 
would also reduce the distortions that result from the large gap between price and marginal cost. 
This includes the time that patients and physicians spend trying to game the system to minimize 
drug expenditures, as well as the efforts by insurance companies and other third party payers to 
restrict access to costly drugs. Lower drug prices will also substantially reduce the resources devoted 
to marketing drugs, since the potential payoffs will be far lower. Finally, lower drug prices will 
reduce  the  incentive  for  patients  to  buy  unauthorized  versions  of  drugs,  or  for  producers  to 
manufacture counterfeit drugs. The large gap between drug prices and the actual production costs 
provide an incentive for patients and counterfeiters to take risks.
2 In short, by removing the conflict 
of interest inherent in industry funded trials, it might be possible to achieve both better health 
outcomes and greater economic efficiency. 
 
The Basic Outline: A Mechanism for Publicly Financed 
Clinical Trials 
The central feature of this proposal is the establishment of a network of independent companies, 
operating on long-term federal contracts (8 to 12 years), that would be expected to replace the 
clinical  testing  currently  performed  and/or  financed  by  the  pharmaceutical  industry.  At  2008 
expenditure levels, approximately $20 billion per year would be needed to maintain a level of drug 
testing comparable to that currently supported by the pharmaceutical industry. This amount would 
rise by approximately 10 percent annually for the next decade, the same as the growth rate projected 
for Medicare expenditures on prescription drugs. 
 
The agency that would actually parcel out the contracts could be either the National Institutes of 
Health, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
or  a  new  agency  established  explicitly  for  this  purpose.  The  public  agency  administering  the 
contracts would have the responsibility for assessing the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the 
prime  contractors  and  also  ensuring  that  contractors,  and  any  subcontractors,  adhere  to  ethical 
standards in their conduct of the trials and in the dissemination of research findings. 
 
The firms that are contracted to do the testing would be expected to select drugs for testing based 
on their potential to improve public health. They would make this determination based on the 
evidence  obtained  from  pre-clinical  research.  The  oversight  agency  may  designate  that  each 
contractor restrict itself to drugs designed for a specific class or classes of conditions, but such 
restrictions should not be overly narrow. A key goal of this system is to ensure that there will always 
be  several  contractors  with  overlapping  areas  of  responsibility  to  ensure  that  there  will  be 
competition between them. This should reduce the probability that a potentially promising drug will 
be overlooked and put through clinical testing.  
 
                                                 
2 In the United States, unauthorized versions of drugs are most often from foreign producers whose drugs may not meet 
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The contractors would be expected to conduct all the tests needed to bring drugs through the FDA 
approval process including the three phases of clinical testing and long-term animal-testing. Since all 
trial results would be fully public, the various phases of clinical trials and long-term animal studies 
needed for FDA approval could be performed by different contractors. Any contractor would have 
the full benefit of the information obtained through prior round trials, not just the contractor who 
performed the trials. This openness should ensure competition exists at all stages of the clinical 
testing  process  and  reduce the possibility that potentially beneficial drugs get bottled up in the 
bureaucracy of an inefficient contractor.  
 
In order to minimize the potential for the sort of conflicts of interest that exist under the current 
system,  it  is  essential  that there be a strict separation between the firms that are contracted to 
conduct clinical trials (and any subcontractors) and the pharmaceutical companies that maintain 
intellectual property rights in the affected drugs. This should preclude management or employees of 
contracting firms from having any financial interest with the pharmaceutical companies. In addition, 
all contact between the pharmaceutical companies and the contracting firms should be in the form 
of public documents that can be easily accessed over the Internet.  
 
For example, a pharmaceutical company that believes that it has developed a potentially promising 
drug, could submit its evidence to one or more of the companies contracted to conduct trials. 
However, all the evidence that is submitted should be placed on the Internet, so that it is fully 
public. Any private communications concerning drug testing should be strictly prohibited in the 
same way that lawyers are prohibited from discussing cases with sitting jurors.     
 
Full disclosure rules would also apply to all trial results. All the data collected from trials should be 
made available on the Internet in a timely manner. This would include the full set of data available 
from patient questionnaires (excluding information that could compromise patients’ privacy), so that 
other researchers could independently analyze trial results. This information would also be available 
for practicing physicians trying to determine the best drugs to prescribe for their patients.    
 
The companies that sign master contracts for testing can opt to maintain control over the testing 
process themselves or to subcontract portions of the process to other companies. However, all the 
rules concerning contacts with the pharmaceutical industry and making research results accessible 
would apply in the same way to subcontractors as it does to prime contractors.  
  
The funding for these tests would be appropriated by Congress at a level that should be large 
enough to fully replace the clinical tests performed by the pharmaceutical industry. This additional 
spending could be covered by having Medicare pay sharply lower prices for the drugs purchased 
through its prescription drug benefit. The calculations in a subsequent section of this paper assume 
that prices fall by 40 percent from current levels, which is roughly in line with the prices currently 
paid  by  the  Veteran’s  Administration.  While  this  system  is  not  designed  to  prohibit  privately 
financed  clinical  tests,  the  lower  prices  paid  by  Medicare,  and  possibly  by  other  government 
purchasers, would apply to drugs regardless of whether or not the tests were financed through the 
public system. At sharply lower drug prices, it would probably not be profitable for pharmaceutical 
companies to pay for their own clinical trials.   
 
The Benefits of Independently Financed Drug Tests 
There are a number of benefits that can be expected from a system of publicly financed prescription 
drug trials. The most important benefit would be the elimination of conflicts of interest that can The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs  ￿ 6 
prevent the full and accurate disclosure of test results. The separation of the testing process from 
any intellectual property rights in the drugs being tested eliminates the incentive that exists within 
the current system to bias the tests in ways that exaggerate the effectiveness of drugs, and to conceal 
evidence of negative side effects. A strict condition for any contractor/sub-contractor is that all the 
results from the trials must be fully public and revealed in a timely manner. The contractors would 
therefore have a very strong incentive to fully disclose information, since failure to do so would 
result in the loss of the contract and possibly fines and penalties as well, and no incentive to conceal 
it. The change in the incentive structure will allow the scientific community, as well as practicing 
physicians, to get the full benefit of the information obtained in the trials.     
 
There would be many additional benefits from a system of publicly financed clinical trials. One of 
the  main  benefits  is  that  under  this  system  fewer  resources  are  likely  to  be  wasted  in  the 
development of drugs that offer little net medical benefit over existing drugs. Under the current 
system, drug companies can hope to recover a substantial portion of their research costs by carrying 
a drug through the approval process, even if it has no reason to believe that the drug offers any 
significant benefit relative to existing drugs. If a copycat drug can win a portion of the patent rents 
gained by drug(s) already approved, then it may more than cover the cost of additional testing and 
recover some or all of its sunk research costs.
3  
 
Under the publicly financed system, the public contractors would have little motivation to test a 
drug in a situation where pre-clinical evidence or early phase clinical trials provided no reason to 
believe that the new drug would offer a substantial medical benefit compared with existing drugs. 
From the standpoint of the contractors, testing a drug that essentially duplicates the function of 
existing drugs would be a wasteful expenditure. In addition, all the testing can be designed to be 
explicitly comparative, using standard research methodologies so that the effectiveness of a newly 
tested drug can be readily measured against the effectiveness of existing drugs. In cases where a 
drug(s) has already been approved in the same class, the most efficient (and ethical) test of a new 
drug would be against a control group that was given a drug that was already approved.   
 
In the years from 1990 to 2004, almost 80 percent of the drugs approved by the FDA fell into the 
standard classification, meaning that they provided no significant advance over existing drugs.
4 Many 
of the drugs receiving standard classification probably would be still be approved under the system 
of publicly funded trials outlined here. In some cases, the drugs were involved in races for approval 
in which the success of a competing drug was uncertain. In such instances, it may be efficient to 
continue the testing necessary to carry a drug through the FDA approval process in order to have an 
additional treatment option. However, this is only likely to be the case with drugs that are already in 
the last stages of testing so that the marginal cost of gaining approval is relatively small.  
 
It  may  also  be  beneficial  to  bring  some  drugs  with  standard  classifications  through  the  FDA 
approval process if the existing drug(s) are known to have harmful side effects or to react badly with 
other drugs that some patients may be taking. Nonetheless, the altered incentive structure of a 
system of publicly financed drug trials is likely to lead to a substantial reduction in the number of 
non-priority drugs carried through the FDA approval process. This can lead to substantial cost 
                                                 
3 Under the current system, by providing additional potential competition, a duplicative drug may lower the cost of the 
competing drug(s) that are already approved. However, if prices were already pushed much closer to marginal cost, 
then the impact of an additional drug on prices would be expected to be considerably smaller. 
4 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “CDER NDAs Approved in Calendar 
Years 1990-2004 by Therapeutic Potential and Chemical Type” [http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/pstable.htm ]. Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2008 ￿  7 
savings, especially since Phase III trials (the last stage before the approval) are by far the most 
expensive part of the clinical testing process.
5   
 
It is worth noting that a publicly-funded system would not preclude drug companies from paying for 
their own trials. Since drug prices would be far lower under this system, at least for drugs purchased 
through public sector programs (which account for more than half of spending on prescription 
drugs), drug companies would have far less incentive to pay for drug trials. However, if a company 
was confident that its drug would offer substantial benefits over existing drugs, in spite of the refusal 
of the publicly financed contractors to pay for clinical trials, they would be free to do so at their own 
expense and submit the drug for FDA approval, just as they do now. In the event that the drug is 
approved, it would be priced in the same way as drugs that were tested through the publicly funded 
system, at least for public sector programs. This would discourage pharmaceutical companies from 
testing drugs that they did not believe offered significant benefits over existing drugs; however, in 
cases in which they believed that the publicly financed testers had overlooked an important new 
drug, they would still have incentive to carry through the necessary tests to gain FDA approval. 
 
The full public disclosure of research results should also help to advance the research process. If all 
the information from drug trials is made fully accessible to other researchers, it will vastly increase 
the amount that can be learned from these trials. Researchers will be able to readily analyze data 
within and across studies to determine the relative effectiveness of different drugs and the frequency 
of side effects for specific demographic groups and for those suffering from medical conditions, in 
addition to the condition being treated by a specific drug. This system of full disclosure sharply 
contrasts with the current system under which companies release only the data that they choose and 
the FDA strictly prohibits sharing any data without the approval of the company that submitted it. 
 
Another potential benefit of a publicly financed system of clinical trials is that it eliminates the 
potential for inappropriate payments to doctors for participating in drug trials. Under the current 
system of industry-financed clinical tests, payments to physicians for taking part in clinical trials can 
effectively include a kickback component for prescribing the company’s drugs. There have been 
numerous news accounts of incidents in which drug companies deliberately overpaid doctors to 
participate in drug trials as a way of rewarding them for prescribing their drugs (e.g. Gardiner, 2004; 
Eichenwald and Colata, 1999a and Eichenwald and Colata, 1999b).  
 
A recent study found that doctors who were paid to take part in clinical trials were more likely to 
prescribe  the  company’s  drugs  after  their  participation  than  before.
6  The  higher  propensity  to 
prescribe the company’s drugs could be due to the fact that the doctors who take part in these trials 
are  more  familiar  with  the  company’s  products,  but  it  may  also  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
participation  in  trials  is  an  effective  mechanism  for  sharing  some  of  the  rents  earned  from 
prescriptions.  
 
The economics of this relationship are straightforward. The prescription price of a brand drug is far 
above  the  marginal  cost  of  production.  This  gives  the  manufacturer  substantial  rents  for  each 
prescription  issued.  Kicking  back  a  portion  of  this rent  to  the doctors who write prescriptions 
increases their incentive to prescribe the company’s drug. Of course, outright kickbacks are illegal. 
However, it is not typically possible for the government to know the true market price for physicians 
                                                 
5 Dimasi et al. (2003) estimates that Phase III tests cost 65.3 percent more than Phase I and Phase II tests combined 
(Table 3).   
6 Andersen, M., J. Kragstrup, and J. Søndergaard, 2006. How Conducting a Clinical Trial Affects Physicians' Guideline 
Adherence and Drug Preferences, Journal of the American Medical Association, 295: 2759-2764. The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs  ￿ 8 
taking part in the clinical trial of particular drug. Therefore, a company can typically make payments 
for participation that far exceed the doctor’s true costs as a way to kick back a portion of their 
profits. 
 
By removing any link between the company that owns a drug and the doctors who take part in trials, 
a system of publicly financed trials eliminates this potential abuse of the testing process. This should 
lead to lower cost clinical trials, since the payments should reflect doctors’ actual costs. It would also 
eliminate the potential consequence of kickbacks from drug companies: doctors who prescribe drugs 
that may be inappropriate for their patients.  
   
A system of publicly financed clinical trials would also have very large international benefits. A 
major source of contention in many recent trade agreements have been efforts by the United States 
and other wealthy countries to require developing countries to grant lengthy periods of marketing 
exclusivity for test data submitted to government regulatory authorities. This restriction effectively 
precludes generic competition for the period of exclusivity, potentially raising the price of life-saving 
drugs  by  several  hundred  percent  above  the  competitive  market  price.  In  fact,  the  protections 
granted for data exclusivity are in some ways stronger than patent protection. While it is sometimes 
possible to innovate around a patent, conducting clinical tests on a drug that is already recognized as 
safe and effective would require giving placebos to a control group when it is already known that an 
effective treatment is available. This would violate generally accepted standards of medical ethics. 
While it is appropriate that other countries share with U.S. taxpayers the cost of paying for clinical 
trials, it is possible to devise far more efficient mechanisms for sharing these costs that do not 
jeopardize the life and health of people in developing countries (e.g. Hubbard and Love, 2004).  
 
To sum up, the largest potential benefit from a system of publicly financed clinical trials would be 
the elimination of the incentive to misrepresent or conceal research findings. In addition, the full 
public disclosure of findings should facilitate the research process, leading to more progress than is 
possible  under  the  existing  system.  There  are  likely  to  be  additional  benefits  as  well,  most 
importantly that less money is likely to be wasted developing copycat drugs and the testing could be 
designed to provide a clearer basis for the comparative effectiveness of different drugs. This system 
should also eliminate the need to include provisions for data exclusivity in trade agreements, which 
have raised the price of drugs for tens of millions of people in the developing world. 
 
The  Budget  Arithmetic  of  Publicly-Funded  Clinical 
Trials 
The  target  of  a  program  for  publicly  financing  prescription  drug  trials  should  be  to  essentially 
replace the quantity of trials that are being financed at present by the private sector with trials 
supported by public financing. As noted earlier, this could likely be accomplished with a somewhat 
smaller level of spending since trials of some duplicative drugs would probably not be conducted by 
a publicly financed system. Also, the per person cost of trials may be somewhat lower in a publicly 
financed system since there would not be a kickback component in the fees paid to doctors for their 
participation. However, even if some savings prove possible, the current level of spending by the 
industry on drug trials should provide a reasonably good target for the amount of funding that it 
would be necessary to appropriate in order to maintain the same pace of drug development.  
 Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2008 ￿  9 
TABLE 1 














Percent of  
Clinical R&D  
Replaced 
NSF  $17 b (2003)  5%  $23.7 b  $11.9 b  168.1% 
PhRMA  $39 b (2004)  8%  $58.2 b  $29.1 b  68.7% 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, see text. 
 
A  recent  Congressional  Budget  Office  study  of  research  and  development  spending  in  the 
pharmaceutical industry reported an estimate from the National Science Foundation (NSF) that the 
industry spent $17 billion (in 2005 dollars) on R&D in 2003.
7 It also reported an estimate from the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the industry trade group, that 
the industry spent $39 billion (also in 2005 dollars) R&D in 2004. The largest single source of 
difference between these estimates is that the latter estimate includes post-approval research. The 
PhRMA  estimate  also  includes  foreign  research  conducted  by  U.S.-based  companies,  as well as 
research on processes. The NSF estimates imply a 5 percent real average annual growth rate since 
1980, while PhRMA’s estimates imply an 8 percent growth rate. Applying the implied growth rates 
to both numbers would imply spending of $21.9 billion in 2007 using the NSF data and $52.1 billion 
using the PhRMA data.  
 
Dimasi (2003, p 166) estimates that approximately 50 percent of R&D spending is accounted for by 
clinical tests as opposed to pre-clinical research.
8 This implies that clinical spending in 2007 would 
be between $12 billion and $26.1 billion, depending on whether the NSF estimate or the PhRMA 
estimates are used. Given this range, a spending level of $20 billion should be sufficient to replace all 
or most of the clinical testing currently funded by the industry as shown in Table 1.
9 
 
It is worth assessing whether a program of this size would be sufficient to finance a volume of 
clinical trials comparable to the number currently financed by the industry. Dimasi estimated that 
the average cost of a clinical trial in the mid-to-late ‘90s was $29.1 million (in 2000).
10 Assuming 8 
percent real growth in costs, and that the mid-point of the trials for the period examined by Dimasi 
was 1997, the average cost of a trial in 2007 would be approximately $79 million. This means that a 
$20 billion appropriation would be sufficient to support 253 clinical trials. With new drug approvals 
averaging just over 80 per year (two-thirds of which do not involve new molecular entities), this level 
of funding would be sufficient to support an average of 3 trials per approved drug.  
 
It is worth noting that Dimasi’s estimate of the cost of clinical trials is considerably higher than is 
suggested  by  other evidence. Love (2003) reports evidence on costs from several sources. One 
source, the Pharmaceutical Education and Research Institute (PERI), found average trial costs of  
                                                 
7 These numbers can be found in Congressional Budget Office, 2006, p. 17 
[http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf]. 
8 This figure can be obtained by backing out his estimate that 30 percent of the cost of developing a specific drug is 
assumed to be attributed to pre-clinical research. Dimasi assumed that clinical spending was associated with pre-clinical 
research that was done on average five years earlier. Given the 11 percent nominal growth in spending that the study 
finds, this implies that current pre-clinical research should be approximately equal to spending on clinical research.   
9 Some of the post-approval testing is performed to demonstrate that a company’s drug is superior to alternatives, in 
order to increase market share. While such comparative testing can serve a useful purpose, if the initial tests were 
designed to facilitate assessments of comparative effectiveness, there would be less reason for conducting such tests 
post-approval.  
10 This figure is obtained by averaging the cost of the three pre-approval trial phases as shown in Table 1 (p 162).  The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs  ￿ 10 
TABLE 2 
Number of Clinical Trials Supported by $20 Billion Appropriation 
   Trial Cost (2007)  Trials Supported  Trials Per Approved Drug 
Dimasi  $79.0 million  253  3 
PERI  $37.7 million  530  6 
Source: Dimasi, Love, and author’s calculations, see text.  
 
TABLE 3 
Number of Enrolled Patient Supported by $20 Billion Appropriation 
  Per Patient Cost  Patients Enrolled  Patients Per Approved Drug 
Dimasi (8% growth)  $14,088  1,420,000  16,700 
Dimasi (5% growth)  $10,270  1,950,000  22,940 
Source: Dimasi, 2003 and author’s calculations, see text. 
 
$17.0 million over roughly the same period examined by Dimasi.
11 If the 5 percent real growth rate 
in expenses found by NSF is applied to the PERI estimates, then the average cost of trial in 2007 
would be $37.7 million. At this cost, a $20 billion annual expenditure would be sufficient to fund 
530 clinical trials a year, more than 6 trials per approved drug.  
 
In assessing the adequacy of this level of spending, it is important to keep in mind that the two-
thirds  of  new  drug  approvals  do  not  involve  new  molecular  entities  and,  therefore,  would  not 
require phase I tests to determine safety. So, even with the higher cost implied by Dimasi’s analysis, 
the proposed level of spending would likely be enough to replace all or almost of the clinical trials 
currently financed by the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Another way to assess the impact of a $20 billion annual appropriation for clinical testing would be 
to  calculate  the  number of patients who could potentially be enrolled in trials for this level of 
expenditure. Dimasi calculated that the average number of patients enrolled in trials in their sample 
was 5,303 (p177, fn 41).
12 This implies a cost of $5,490 per patient. Assuming an 8 percent real 
growth rate, this implies an average per person cost of $14,088 in 2007. At this cost, the $20 billion 
appropriation would be sufficient to support trials involving 1,420,000 patients enrolled in clinical 
trials. If the 5 percent real growth rate derived from the NSF’s estimates is used, then the average 
cost per patient in 2007 would be $10,270. At this cost, the $20 billion appropriation would be 
sufficient to support 1,950,000 patients enrolled in clinical trials. 
 
While these calculations are imprecise, they suggest that a $20 billion appropriation would be in the 
range  of  the  funding  needed  to  replace  the  clinical  trials  currently  being  supported  by  the 
pharmaceutical industry. Insofar as the incentives created by the current system lead to trials for 
drugs that provide little medical benefit, there will be less need for trials under a publicly funded 
system, thereby allowing for savings relative to the current system or the testing of more useful 
drugs. Similarly, if the current system provides incentives for overpaying doctors as an inducement 
to prescribe drugs, then the cost per trial and per patient will decline in a system of publicly financed 
trials. The reduction in per patient costs will also allow for either savings to taxpayers or for more 
useful drugs to be tested.  
 
                                                 
11 Love 2003, Table 2.6-1. This figure attaches Dimasi’s estimates of the frequency of each phase of clinical trials.   
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TABLE 4 














2007  $55.0  $0.00  $0.00  $0.00  $0.00  $0.00 
2008  63.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2009  70.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2010  78.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2011  86.4  7.9  8.6  13.0  0.8  5.1 
2012  96.6  17.6  20.3  30.4  2.7  12.9 
2013  107.7  29.4  32.3  48.5  2.9  19.1 
2014  121.6  44.2  48.6  73.0  4.4  28.7 
2015  136.9  49.8  54.8  82.1  5.0  32.4 
2016  152.5  55.5  61.0  91.5  5.5  36.0 
2017  169.9  61.8  67.9  101.9  6.2  40.2 
2018  189.2  68.8  75.7  113.5  6.9  44.7 
2019  210.8  76.6  84.3  126.5  7.7  49.8 
2020  234.8  85.4  93.9  140.9  8.5  55.5 
Total  1773.9  496.8  547.5  821.2  50.7  324.4 
Source: CBO and author’s calculations, see text. *Baseline spending; in billions of current dollars. 
 
As  a  practical  matter,  if  Congress  were  to  immediately  approve  a  program  for  publicly funded 
clinical trials, it would take several years to get it up and running. The calculations in Table 4 assume 
that a program for public funding of drug trial is first put in place in 2011. The calculations assume 
that the $20 billion needed to approximately cover testing costs in 2007 rises at the same rate that 
the  CBO  projects  spending  on  the  Medicare  prescription  drug  program  to  rise.  This  puts  the 
equivalent expenditure in 2011 at $31.4 billion. It is assumed that one-fourth of this sum is spent in 
the first year, with the spending increased in equal increments (relative to the cost of the Medicare 
drug program), so that by 2014 spending is assumed to have risen to a level sufficient to replace 
industry-supported drug testing.
13 In subsequent years, it is assumed that expenditures on clinical 
tests rise at the same rate as projected spending on the prescription drug plan.  
 
The potential savings associated with the plan assume alternatively in a “low saving” and “high 
saving” scenario that Medicare negotiates prices that are either 40 percent or 60 percent less than 
what is currently paid by beneficiaries. These figures are derived from comparisons between drug 
prices in the United States and other wealthy countries, as well as the prices paid by the Veterans 
Administration.
14 A savings of 40 percent against current prices would put prices at levels that are  
                                                 
13 It is not clear that it would take four years to get a program of publicly financed clinical trials fully in place. The 
government will not actually be conducting the research, rather it will be contracting with private firms to oversee the 
process. Presumably, the prime contractors would rely on the structures that are already in place, which includes 
independent firms that conduct outsourced trials for the industry. It would be best not to rush a new system in place 
before all the problems can be uncovered, but it is important to realize that it will primarily be using a structure that 
already exists rather than building a new one from scratch.   
14 See Congressional Budget Office, 2004a , “Would Prescription Drug Importation Reduce U.S. Drug Spending?” 
   Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5406/04-29-
PrescriptionDrugs.pdf], and  U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Commission, 2004. “Pharmaceutical The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs  ￿ 12 
TABLE 5 
Economy-Wide Prescription Spending and Potential Savings*, Low Savings Scenario 
Source: CBO, CMS, and author’s calculations, see text. *Billions of current dollars 
 
comparable to those paid in several other countries. A savings of 60 percent would likely lead prices 
that are as low, or lower, than those paid in any other wealthy country. The savings are assumed to 
be phased in over four years, to coincide with the ramping up of spending on clinical trials.  
 
The low savings scenario shown in column three shows gross savings of $8.6 billion in 2011, the 
first year the program is projected to be in place, which rises to $48.6 billion in 2014, when spending 
has reached a level sufficient to replace industry supported research. Savings continue to increase in 
step with the projected rise in Medicare drug expenditures, reaching $93.9 billion in 2020. In the low 
savings scenario, the total gross savings over the ten year period is $547.5 billion. The net savings, 
after covering the costs of the clinical trials, ends up being $50.7 billion over this ten year period.  
 
It is important to remember that lower prices for drugs purchased under the Medicare drug plan will 
also lead to large savings for beneficiaries. Beneficiaries currently pay an average of almost 70 
percent of the cost of drugs purchased under the program.
15 Cuts in drug prices of 40 percent or 60 
percent would reduce the payments by Medicare beneficiaries proportionately. 
 
Both the gross and net savings are considerably larger in the high savings scenario, which assumes 
that drug prices decline by 60 percent. In this scenario, the gross savings rise from $13.0 billion 
in2011 to $73 billion in 2014. By 2020 they are projected to be $140.9 billion. Total gross savings  
                                                                                                                                                             
Price Controls in OECD Countries,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce 
[http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/DrugPricingStudy.pdf]) 
15 Congressional Budget Office, 2004. “A Detailed Description of CBO’s Cost Estimate for the Medicare prescription 
Drug Benefit” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, Table 7  
[http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=5668&type=0]. 




















2007  $55.00   $19.80   $17.40   $137.40   $0.00   $0.00   $0.00   $0.00   $0.00  
2008  63.9  20.8  18.6  144.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2009  70.3  24.6  20.0  153.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2010  78.4  28.1  21.7  163.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2011  86.4  33.4  23.5  174.1  0.8  0.0  2.4  17.4  20.5 
2012  96.6  38.8  25.6  185.6  2.7  0.0  5.1  37.1  45.0 
2013  107.7  42.6  27.8  200.7  2.9  0.0  8.3  60.2  71.5 
2014  121.6  45.1  30.2  217.2  4.4  0.0  12.1  86.9  103.4 
2015  136.9  48.4  32.7  235.6  5.0  0.0  13.1  94.2  112.3 
2016  152.5  53.9  35.6  255.6  5.5  0.0  14.2  102.2  122.0 
2017  169.9  60.0  38.8  277.3  6.2  0.0  15.5  110.9  132.6 
2018  189.2  66.9  42.2  300.8  6.9  0.0  16.9  120.3  144.1 
2019  210.8  74.5  45.9  326.4  7.7  0.0  18.4  130.6  156.6 
2020  234.8  82.9  50.0  354.1  8.5  0.0  20.0  141.6  170.2 
Total  1773.9  639.8  430.0  3125.8  50.7  0.0  126.0  901.5  1078.2 Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2008 ￿  13 
TABLE 6 
Economy-Wide Prescription Spending and Potential Savings*, High Savings Scenario 




















2007  $55.00   $19.80   $17.40   $137.40  $0.00   $0.00   $0.00   $0.00   $0.00  
2008  63.9  20.8  18.6  144.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2009  70.3  24.6  20.0  153.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2010  78.4  28.1  21.7  163.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
2011  86.4  33.4  23.5  174.1  5.1  0.0  3.5  26.1  34.7 
2012  96.6  38.8  25.6  185.6  12.9  0.0  7.7  55.7  76.2 
2013  107.7  42.6  27.8  200.7  19.1  0.0  12.5  90.3  121.9 
2014  121.6  45.1  30.2  217.2  28.7  0.0  18.1  130.3  177.2 
2015  136.9  48.4  32.7  235.6  32.4  0.0  19.6  141.4  193.3 
2016  152.5  53.9  35.6  255.6  36.0  0.0  21.4  153.4  210.8 
2017  169.9  60.0  38.8  277.3  40.2  0.0  23.3  166.4  229.8 
2018  189.2  66.9  42.2  300.8  44.7  0.0  25.3  180.5  250.5 
2019  210.8  74.5  45.9  326.4  49.8  0.0  27.6  195.8  273.2 
2020  234.8  82.9  50.0  354.1  55.5  0.0  30.0  212.4  297.9 
Total  1773.9  639.8  430.0  3125.8  324.4  0.0  189.0  1352.3  1865.7 
Source: CBO, CMS, and author’s calculations, see text. *Billions of current dollars.  
 
over the ten year period are projected to be $821.2 billion. Total net savings in the high savings 
scenario are $324.4 billion over the ten year period. 
 
The potential savings from the Medicare prescription drug program are large enough by themselves 
to easily cover the expense of publicly financed clinical trials. However, there could also be savings 
for  state  and  local  governments  if  the  federal  government  designed  a  system  in  which  it  also 
negotiated lower prices on the behalf of other units of government. In principle, the government 
could even have lower drug prices apply to private insurance plans or a government-run plan that 
served the population as a whole. Table 5 shows the potential savings from having lower prices 
apply to other segments of the market under the “low savings” scenario.  
 
Columns one through four show baseline projections of spending on the Medicare drug program, 
other federal spending on prescription drugs (largely through the Veterans Administration), state 
and  local  spending,  and  private  sector  spending,  as  projected  by  the  Centers  for  Medicare and 
Medicaid  Services  (CMS).
16  Columns  five  through  eight  show  projected  savings  under  the 
assumption that drug prices are reduced by 40 percent relative to the baseline. The savings shown 
for the Medicare drug program are net of the cost of clinical trials. The calculations assume no 
                                                 
16 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007. “National Health Expenditure Projections, 2006-2016.” 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Table 11  
[http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2006.pdf]. The projections for the “other 
federal government category” are obtained by subtracting the CBO projections for the Medicare drug program from the 
CMS projections for all federal spending. It is assumed that the growth rate from 2015 to 2016 continues through 2020 
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savings  for  the  “other  federal  government”  category since  the  Veteran’s  Administration already 
negotiates substantial discounts with the pharmaceutical industry.   
 
Assuming the same four-year phase-in of price reductions as in the Medicare drug plan, the savings 
for state and local governments rise from $2.4 billion in 2011 to $12.1 billion in 2014. They rise to 
$20 billion in 2020. Total savings for state and local governments over this period are projected at 
$126 billion. Savings from private sector spending on prescription drugs rises from $17.4 billion in 
2011 to $86.9 billion in 2014. The annual savings grow to $141.6 billion in 2020. The total savings 
projected from private sector spending is $901.5 billion. Combining savings across sectors gives a 
total savings of $1078.2 billion over the ten-year period.  
 
The high savings scenario shown in Table 6 suggests the possibility of even more dramatic savings. 
In this scenario, the savings to state and local governments rise from $3.5 billion in 2011 to $18.1 
billion  in  2014,  reaching  $30  billion  in  2030.  The  total  projected  savings  for  state  and  local 
governments over the ten year period is $189 billion. Savings from private sector spending rises 
from $34.7 billion in 2011 to $177.2 billion in 2014. The savings rise to $297.9 billion in 2020 for a 
total over the period of $1,352.3 billion over the ten year period. The total savings for all sectors in 
this scenario is projected at $1,865.7 billion over the ten-year period. The savings projected for the 
last year are more than 1.2 percent of GDP.   
 
Efficiency  Gains  From  Bringing  Drug  Prices  In  Line 
With Marginal Costs 
In addition to the directly measurable savings from lower drug prices, there will also be gains in 
efficiency from having drugs priced closer to their marginal cost of production, some of which could 
have a substantial impact on public health. The largest source of efficiency gains would be the 
reduction in marketing expenses that would result from lower drug prices. A recent study found that 
the  industry’s  marketing  expenses  were  equal  to  18.2  percent  of  sales,  approximately  the  same 
amount of money that the industry spends on research (Donohue et al., 2007). If drug prices were 
reduced by 40 to 60 percent from current levels, there would be far less incentive to spend money 
marketing prescription drugs. The vast majority of the marketing that currently takes place would 
almost certainly not be profitable at sharply lower drug prices.  
 
While some useful information is conveyed to physicians through this marketing, it is also almost 
certainly the case that much misinformation is conveyed as well. The goal of marketing is to increase 
sales,  not  promote  public  health.  Undoubtedly,  there  are  many  occasions  in  which  sales 
representatives persuade physicians to prescribe their drugs in cases in which they are no better, or 
possibly worse, than other drugs on the market.
17 It is desirable that physicians are informed about 
new drugs as they become available, but there are almost certainly more efficient and more effective 
methods than the current system.
18 
                                                 
17 There have been many accounts of marketing abuses by the pharmaceutical industry’s sales agents. For example, a 
recent New York Times article reported that the industry seeks out former cheerleaders to hire as its representatives 
(Saul, 2005). 
18 Marketing also has a defensive aspect. If all companies refrain from marketing, then total sales will likely be little 
changed, although there would be some redistribution of sales away from those companies with the most effective 
marketing networks. This situation would, in general, lead to a large increase in profits for the industry as a whole. 
However, as soon as some firms begin to market their drugs, then other firms are forced to incur marketing expenses 
to protect their market share. In this way, the lower prices that prevail in a system of publicly funded clinical trials may Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2008 ￿  15 
The next most obvious efficiency gain from substantially lower drug prices would be that patients, 
physicians and insurers would devote less time and resources to finding ways to game rules, in the 
case of patients and physicians, or setting up and enforcing rules that cannot be easily gamed in the 
case of insurance companies. It is likely that the costs involved in gaming and policing these rules are 
substantial.  
 
For example, simply the time involved in selecting among insurance plans is likely to be substantial 
relative  to  the  production  costs  of  prescription  drugs.  The  Medicare  Payments  Advisory 
Commission found that the median amount of time that Medicare beneficiaries spent deciding on 
plans  was  eight  hours  (Medicare  Payments  Advisory  Council,  2006).  Assessing  this  time  at  the 
average hourly compensation, which was approximately $25 an hour in 2007, the time that the 
median Medicare beneficiary spent choosing plans was worth approximately $200.
19 This amount is 
only about 7 percent of average drug expenditures under the current system, so the time may have 
been well invested if it allowed beneficiaries to reduce their costs. However, if drug prices were 60 
percent lower, then the potential savings from different insurance options would be correspondingly 
reduced. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that beneficiaries would spend far less time deciding 
among insurance options in a system where drug prices were brought closer to marginal cost. 
 
The time spent selecting among Medicare prescription drug plans is typical of the efforts by doctors 
and patients to circumvent restrictions imposed by insurance companies. There are a wide variety of 
mechanisms  that  can  be employed  to  get  around such restrictions.
20 These actions may require 
considerable research by physicians or their staff or patients. They may also cause them to commit 
acts of questionable legality. If drugs were priced closer to their marginal cost, the incentive for such 
behavior would be substantially reduced.  
 
Finally,  the  large  divergence  between  price  and  marginal  cost  creates  an  incentive  to  seek  out 
unauthorized versions of drugs, which are of questionable safety. This most often takes the form of 
buying drugs from other countries. While other wealthy countries have effective regulatory agencies 
that can ensure drugs meet high safety standards, this is not true for many developing countries. If 
patients  cannot  be  certain  of  the  supply  network,  then  they may  be  buying  drugs  that  are not 
effective or safe. 
 
In the same vein, high drug prices also provide incentives for counterfeit drugs. This incentive exists 
even for the intermediaries in the industry’s own supply chain, who stand to make substantial profits 
by either diluting drugs or substituting cheaper alternatives. In principle, this sort of counterfeiting 
can be restricted through careful regulation and stiff penalties, but the incentives for counterfeiting 
would be far smaller if drugs sold at prices that were closer to the cost of production. If drug prices 
grow as currently projected, then incentives for counterfeiting will increase correspondingly through 
time.  
 
In short, there would be substantial efficiency gains through a variety of channels if prescription 
drug prices were brought down closer to the cost of production. Furthermore, since lower prices 
                                                                                                                                                             
push the industry to a scenario in which most marketing expenses are unprofitable, but the savings may leave total 
profits largely unaffected.  
19 This is taken from Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007), Table 3.2.  
20 For example, a physician may prescribe a drug for a use for which an insurance company will cover the cost of a 
prescription, rather than for the actual use intended. Physicians may also over-prescribe drugs for a period in which the 
drug is covered by insurance, so that the patient can build up a supply for a period in which the drug may not be 
covered.  The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs  ￿ 16 
would reduce the incentive for patients to seek out unauthorized versions of drugs, or for outright 
counterfeiting, lower drug price. 
 
Furthermore, since lower prices would reduce the incentive for patients to seek out unauthorized 
versions of drugs, or for outright counterfeiting, lower drug prices could also have important public 
health dividends in addition to increasing access to drugs. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper outlines a proposal for replacing the current system of industry-financed clinical trials of 
prescription drugs with a system of publicly funded trials. The main benefit of this system is that it 
would eliminate the conflict of interest that is inherent when the party that conducts the trial has a 
direct financial stake in the outcome. Under plausible assumptions, a system of publicly funded trials 
can  easily  be  financed  by  the  savings  from  paying  lower  prices  for  prescription  drugs  through 
Medicare. In addition, the restructuring of the industry that would follow from publicly funded trials 
could lead to savings on prescription drugs for the population as a whole, which would lead to 
substantial efficiency gains for society.  
 Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2008 ￿  17 
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